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The authors whose articles follow have 
undertaken an extraordinarily difficult 
task. To evaluate properly the antitrust 
output of the Reagan administration, 
and thus to be in a position to pre· 
dict how its legacy will survive, requires 
the analysis of at least five broadly de· 
fined categories of tasks. Although each 
is interrelated, a comprehensive evalua· 
tion should consider the administra· 
tion's success or lack of success concern· 
ing: 1) Cases; 2) Guidance to Business; 
3) Effects on the Rest of the Antitrust 
World; 4) Advances in the Antitrust 
Field; and 5) Fidelity to the Antitrust 
Laws. 
My task is to suggest how these five 
themes might be analyzed. I do not in-
tend to fill in the framework-to do so 
would be an enormous project. My task 
instead is to set out some of the factors 
involved in this endeavor. Throughout 
this article I will use the areas of horizon-
tal mergers and vertical restraints as illus-
trations. These examples, however, by ne-
cessity will be used only in a superficial 
manner, merely as a hint of the type of 
analysis that should be performed in de-
tail in a proper analysis of the antitrust 
lega(:y of the Reagan administration_ 
The four articles that follow have the 
difficult task of helping to fill in the 
framework I will construct. None, how-
ever, conceivably could come close to an-
alyzing all of the relevant issues accu· 
rately and completely. Their mission is 
only to start the process. 
I. Cases 
The first way of analyzing the legacy of 
the Reagan administration is in terms of 
cases. Perhaps the first question most of 
us ask in performing such an evaluation 
is, "How many cases of each type of anti-
trust violation did the administration 
file?" Of course, we all understand that 
the raw numbers game is far too simple 
an analytical tool. In addition to know-
ing the number of filed cases for each 
type of antitrust violation, we also want 
to know the percentage the government 
won,1 how each case affected consumers, 
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and the magnitude of the effects of each 
case (i.e., was the case large or smaIl).2 
Any rigorous analysis along these lines is 
extraordinarily difficult to perform. 
For example, what is the optimal num-
ber of vertical restraints cases the admin-
istration should have brought per year? 
The number of such cases brought by 
the Reagan administration has, of 
course, been close to zero.3 Many believe 
that the optimal number is zero, but 
other respected analysts believe the opti-
mal number is significantly greater.4 In 
fact, it is difficult to evaluate the welfare 
effects of most vertical restraints cases. 
In principle, of course, this can be done, 
since each successful case involved a 
challenge to an exi&ting vertical restraint. 
The market(s) can be evaluated both be-
fore and after the suit. As a practical mat-
ter, however, this task is extremely diffi-
cult to perform. 
For instance, late in the Carter admin-
istration the Federal Trade Commission 
prevailed. The Commission hired out· 
side economists and devoted a consider-
able amount of in-house staff time to the 
project. Their conclusion was that the 
Commission's suits probably helped con-
sumers in ten cases and probably hurt 
them in five.5 Significantly, however, this 
study took five years to complete. This 
powerfully illustrates how difficult it is to 
evaluate the legacy of the Reagan admin-
istration. For if we undertake the kind of 
rigorous analysis that the task truly reo 
quires we might not know the results for 
several years. 
As another illustration of a the diffi-
culties involved, consider the problems 
that inevitably arise in an evaluation of 
the administration's horizontal merger 
program. We start again with an ideolog· 
ical question-what is the optimal num-
ber of merger cases that the government 
should have brought per year? A recent 
head of the Federal Trade Commission's 
Bureau of Economics, Dr. Robert Tolli-
son, stated that the optimal number was 
zero, that the government should per-
form a natural experiment and not chal-
lenge any mergers_6 Most analysts, of 
course, disagree with Dr. Tollison and be-
lieve that the government should closely 
monitor the merger business. Assuming 
the latter, how do we know what the opti-
mal number should be? And even if we 
can determine this, it becomes quickly 
apparent that the number, by itself, tells 
us very little, since merger challenges vir-
tually always hover near the margin of 
legality, and that margin can shift. 
To illustrate, suppose that in 1980 the 
government usually challenged a merger 
when the Herfindahl increase exceeded 
100.7 Suppose also that the threshold for 
suspicion used by the Reagan adminis-
tration in 1988 is that the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index increase must be at 
least 200 (this seems to be the generally 
accepted perception in the private bar, 
despite the lower numbers contained in 
the Merger Guidelines). Once the anti-
trust community perceived and adjusted 
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to this new, higher threshold, firms 
would be more aggressive in their mer· 
ger activity. Many mergers that never 
would have been attempted eight years 
ago (since they would surely have been 
challenged) would now be attempted 
since the thresholds had risen. Thus, the 
number of mergers actually challenged 
might be the same in 1988 as in 1980, 
except that the market shares of the ones 
actually challenged would be two or 
three times as large in 1988 as in 1980. 
Since the effective threshold for chal· 
lenging mergers has approximately dou· 
bled, we fairly must conclude that we 
have a very different merger policy today 
than in 1980. 
Whether this policy aids consumers is 
debatable, but at a minimum any sensi· 
ble evaluation of the merger policy of 
the Reagan administration must take this 
changing margin into account and look 
beyond the number of cases filed per 
year.8 For this reason, even if the number 
challenged in 1988 is the same as the 
number challenged in 1980, the present 
merger policy might be too lax.9 
Moreover, it is extraordinarily difficult 
to evaluate the impact of any individual 
merger case. Consider a merger chal· 
lenge where the government was success· 
ful. We can study the market both before 
and after the merger was attempted. But 
the market might be the same on both 
occasions, since the merger was blocked. 
It is close to impossible to predict the 
market power and efficiency effects that 
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would have occurred if the merger had 
been allowed to take place, so it is virtu· 
ally impossible to evaluate a challenged 
merger when the government is success· 
ful. 
It may be possible, however, to evaluate 
the impact of a merger that the adminis· 
tration decided not to challenge. In 
these instances one could compare a 
market before the merger to a more con· 
centrated one following the merger. It 
might be possible to get enough data to 
determine whether price and/or effi· 
ciency had risen because of the merger. 
Nevertheless, while this is true in princi· 
pIe, this task has been made much more 
difficult since the Reagan administration 
has eliminated the single best source of 
data for these purposes that had ever 
been constructed-the Federal Trade 
Commission's Line of Business Program. 
We may never be able to evaluate rigor· 
ously and systematically the administra· 
tion's performance in this area. At best it 
will take years to accomplish. 
n. Guidance to Business 
A second m£!jor task facing the admin· 
istration has been to provide guidance to 
business. One way of describing the en· 
forcers' role is to envision a cop on the 
beat preventing bad conduct and provid. 
ing clear signals to business to modify its 
behavior appropriately. If, through effec· 
tive guidance, the government success· 
fully deters most anti·competitive viola· 
tions while successfully encouraging 
most pro·competitive practices, it proba· 
bly is doing an outstanding job even if it 
brings very few cases. We therefore must 
evaluate critically what the Reagan ad· 
ministration has done to affect business 
certainty, to enhance business planning, 
and to lower litigation costs. 
In undertaking this evaluation, we 
might profitably examine the 1982 De· 
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines, 
which were widely hailed, even by liberal 
critics, as doing a relatively good job of 
providing certainty to business. lO The 
1984 revisions, by contrast, were rou· 
tinely criticized, even by conservatives, 
for being overly i!ldefinite and providing 
inadequate guidance to business.ll A key 
provision of the 1982 Guidelines, for in· 
stance, stated that efficiencies were not 
to be considered in the enforcement de· 
cision except in "extraordinary cases" 
that were "otherwise close:' By contrast, 
the 1984 Guidelines provide that the De· 
partment always will consider any 
claimed type of efficiency (in manage· 
ment, administration, overhead, etc.) 
and then will somehow balance these al· 
leged effects against any market power 
effects that the department predicts. The 
1984 Guidelines never state how much 
efficiency will be required to counterbal· 
ance what degree of anticipated market 
power, or how the two are to be traded 
off. I2 To be sure, it is controversial 
whether there should be an efficiency 
defense in merger cases. I3 Even if effi· 
ciency should be an explicit defense, 
however, many believe that the adminis· 
tration should get low marks because its 
chosen norm of the defense provides 
very little guidance to business. 14 
To make matters worse, it generally is 
conceded throughout the antitrust com· 
munity that the Reagan administration 
does not follow its own Merger Guide· 
lines. It is hardly a secret, for example, 
that the market definition standards ac· 
tually used are looser than those written 
into the Guidelines, and that the market 
share and market concentration num· 
bers actually used are more permissive.I5 
Astute lawyers advise their clients of the 
conventional wisdom that the adminis· 
tration ignores its own Guidelines. While 
the Federal Trade Commission in 1982 
issued its own set of merger guidelines, it 
also has plainly ignored them. In fact, 
the current Director of the Bureau of 
Competition, Jeffrey Zuckerman, ac· 
knowledged that the Commission actu· 
ally used significantly higher thresholds 
of suspicion than those contained in the 
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Department of Justice Merger Guide-
lines_16 It may fairly be asked, how good a 
job has the Reagan administration done 
in providing guidance to business, when 
it issues two contradictory sets of merger 
guidelines and then follows neither? 
Much the same analysis applies in the 
vertical restraints area_ The Department 
of Justice issued a set of Vertical Re-
straints Guidelines in 1985_ But, as with 
mergers, everyone in the antitrust com-
munity knows it does not follow them_ In 
fact, one wonders whether the Depart-
ment of Justice ever has undertaken the 
type of analysis dictated by these Guide-
lines_ Experienced observers know that 
the Reagan administration is simply not 
interested in bringing vertical restraints 
cases (unless a government entity is in-
volved)P Virtually all vertical restraints 
challenged in this period have come 
from the states and from private parties_ 
Regardless what one thinks about this as 
an ideological matter, the administra-
tion's disdain for its own Guidelines 
must be evaluated in light of the clarity 
of the behavioral signals provided to 
business. 
A different administration might suc-
cessfully assert that it brought few mer-
ger cases and even fewer vertical reo 
straint cases because it didn't have to: 
that the business community perceived it 
as being so tough and so unmistakably 
clear in these areas that virtually no 
firms ever attempted illegal activity. 
m. Effects on the Rest of the 
Antitrust World 
A third major task of the federal anti-
trust enforcers is to influence the other 
players in the antitrust world. There are 
at least five other important participants 
whose presence the administration must 
consider, and whom it must seek to influ-
ence favorably. Let me briefly outline the 
nature of the inquiry that must be made 
into these relations by one who desires 
to fairly evaluate the antitrust legacy of 
the Reagan administration. 
A. Congress-Every administration 
wants preferred legislation to pass (such 
as the proposed Merger Modernization 
Act of 1986,18 which Congress did not 
enact). There is always some legislation 
that no administration wants: the 
Reagan administration, for instance, is 
generally opposed to the vertical re-
straints legislation currently progressing 
through Congress.19 One crucial ques-
tion, therefore, is how well the adminis-
tration has done in its relations with 
Congress. 
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B. The Courts-The administration's 
Guidelines are the primary mechanism 
by which it seeks to influence the courts. 
The Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines, for example, routinely are 
cited by courts in merger decisions. On 
the other hand, the Department of Jus-
tice Vertical Restraints Guidelines are 
rarely cited by the courts. A recent 
search uncovered more than 100 vertical 
restraints opinions by federal judges that 
could have cited the Department's Verti-
cal Restraints Guidelines. Only two did.2o 
The influence of the Department of Jus-
tice Vertical Restraints Guidelines on the 
courts has been minimal. Beyond the 
Guidelines, the antitrust enforcers also 
file amicus briefs and petitions for cer-
tiorari with the courts and, at least dur-
ing past administrations, have filed test 
cases. A second crucial question, then, is 
how well have administration efforts in 
these areas been received? 
Experienced observers know 
that the Reagan administration 
is simply not interested in 
bringing vertical restraints 
cases (unless a government 
entity is involved). 
C. The state antitrust enforcers-How 
have the relations been between the fed-
eral and the state antitrust enforcers? 
Have they harmoniously worked to-
gether to help each other bring cases 
that benefit the public, or have the fed-
eral enforcers been uncooperative, for-
getting that our form of government is 
one where the states also are supposed to 
play an important role? It seems proba-
ble that the administration's hostility to-
ward the state antitrust enforcers and the 
lack of federal enforcement against both 
mergers and vertical restraints were ma-
jor factors prompting the states to issue 
their own sets of guidelines in these ar-
eas.2! One can usefully debate the wis-
dom of having two sets of guidelines in 
each area (three for mergers, when one 
includes the Federal Trade Commission's 
version). If one is of the opinion this 
multiplicity of conflicting guidelines is 
undesirable, a large portion of the blame 
must be attributed to the lack of federal 
cooperation and the paucity of federal 
antitrust enforcement in these areas. 
The federal "enforcer" created a vac-
uum; the state enforcers filled it. 
D. Other government agencies-The fed-
eral antitrust enforcers seek to influence 
other government agencies on the fed-
eral, state, and local levels. The Federal 
Trade Commission's large and active in-
tervention program, for example, started 
well before the Reagan administration 
but has grown substantially in recent 
years. How has this program done in 
terms of "bang for the buck"? 
E. The private Bar-Private attorneys 
look to the federal government for guid-
ance in many ways. How good a job has 
the administration performed educating 
the private bar and the private business 
community? Has the cooperation been 
constructive, helping private parties 
bring good cases and avoid bad ones? 
How good have the administration's out-
reach and education programs been? 
IV. Advances in the Antitrust Field 
The fourth main task of any adminis-
tration's antitrust enforcers is to advance 
the state of the antitrust field. Regardless 
of one's ideology, surely we all want the 
field to progress, both theoretically and 
empirically. If the Reagan administration 
wants its own policies to live beyond Jan-
uary 20, 1989, it cannot afford to be con-
tent with the state of knowledge it found 
on January 20, 1981. If the administra-
tion's efforts have been limited to the as-
sertion of ideological presumptions and 
conclusions, its successors will be rela-
tively free to ignore its accomplishments. 
If, on the other hand, the administration 
undertook evenhanded research-like 
the vertical restraints impact evaluation 
study launched during the Carter admin-
istration-future administrations will be 
far more likely to perpetuate the admin· 
istration's policies. 
For example, our knowledge about 
vertical restraints in 1988 is much more 
advanced than it was in 1980. Is any of 
this advance due to the Reagan adminis-
tration's efforts? Has the administration 
helped clarify rule-of-reason analysis in 
this area? To illustrate the value of ad-
vances in our knowledge of vertical re-
straints, suppose for simplicity that all 
instances of resale price maintenance 
(RPM) can be explained by two causes-
free rider problems and cartels. Also as-
sume that any RPM caused by free rider 
problems is good for consumers, and 
any RPM caused by cartel behavior hurts 
consumers. Suppose also that it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine in a litiga-
tion setting whether a particular in-
stance of RPM was imposed by cartel 
behavior or whether it was designed to 
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overcome free rider problems. 
For any administration 1.'0 make the 
optimal policy choice in this area, one 
important issue is the relative empirical 
importance of these two causes. Sup-
pose, for the moment, that ninety-five 
percent of the time RPM is imposed to 
overcome free rider problems. Under 
these circumstances we might wish for 
the government to challenge all in· 
stances of RPM despite the fact that do· 
ing so would result in harm five percent 
of the time. This policy might be the 
only way to send clear signals to busi· 
nesses not to use RPM and, thus, to inca· 
pacitate businesses from using RPM to 
harm consumer welfare.22 One of the 
tasks of the Reagan administration has 
been to promote research to answer such 
questions so that future administrations 
can fashion a wise enforcement policy. If 
even·handed research during the last 
eight years were to support the adminis· 
tration's view that RPM is virtually always 
desirable, this would do much to ensure 
the successful continuation of the ad· 
ministration's programs. Can this admin· 
istration point to such unbiased, careful 
research, or instead was it content to con-
duct only liinited research or to conduct 
research as if it knew all the answers? If 
the latter is true, its successors cannot be 
blamed ifthey give relatively less import· 
to the Reagan administration policies 
than if the administration had verified 
its beliefs with even-handed research. 
V. Fidelity to the Antitrust Laws 
The fifth broad task for the antitrust 
enforcers is to follow the law.23 Regard-
less of what elements the Reagan-ap-
pointed antitrust enforcers believe con-
stitute the public interest, the enforcers 
are after all, charged with enforcing ex-
isting legislation. This means fidelity to 
the congressional intent embodied in 
these laws. How well did the administra-
tion do in this fundamental area? In the 
vertical restraints field this administra-
tion has made it clear it would not prose-
cute a vertical restraints case, absent in-
volvement by some unit of government. 
While the system should naturally pro-
vide for prosecutorial discretion, we 
need to inquire as to when the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion turns into 
open disdain for the wishes of Congress_ 
Even if the Reagan administration's dis-
regard for Congress has not been so bla-
tant that the administration can be held 
in contempt, can we conclude that this 
was a good strategy for it to pursue? Or 
did the administration simply encourage 
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tighter congressional control and poten· 
tially damaging legislation in the area? 
In this connection, consider that Section 
7 of the Clayton Act clearly was intended 
by Congress to impose a more restrictive 
merger policy than Section 2 of the Sher· 
man Act provides_ The legislative history 
is indisputable.24 Yet, Paul McGrath, 
while head of the Antitrust Division, an· 
nounced that the Department of Justice 
knowingly was using a Sherman Act 
standard to evaluate mergers!25 How was 
the administration being faithful to the 
intentions of Congress? Is it enough for 
the administration's antitrust enforcers 
to remind us that they were never found 
to be in contempt of Congress, or should 
FOOI'NOfES 
lIt is often difficult to determine whether 
and to what extent the government pre· 
vailed. Moreover, the government's optimal 
rate of victory probably is less than 100. If it 
wins all its cases it probably has been overly 
cautious in its enforcement efforts by avoid-
ing the stronger defendants. 
Even this is far too simple a measure. For 
example, we must be sensitive to the shrink· 
ing staff size of the federal enforcement 
agencies and cast the relevant numbers in 
terms of cases per attorney year. We also 
must ask, if we believe the human capital of 
the federal antitrust enforcers has decreased 
dramatically during the Reagan administra· 
tion, whether this administration bears re· 
sponsibility for this decline. 
3Some early cases were brought by the Fed· 
eral Trade Commission over the objection of 
Reagan appointees. It hardly seems fair to 
count these as part of their Reagan adminis· 
tration legacy. In addition, the federal anti· 
trust enforcers have brought vertical re-
straint cases where a unit of government was 
involved. It also seems unfair to count these 
as "vertical restraint" cases-they would not 
have been brought if they were purely pri· 
vate, and they only reflect this administra· 
tion's belief that the primary source of anti· 
trust problems is the government. For 
further discussion of recent vertical reo 
straint-cases, see Fisher, Johnson, & Lande, 
Do the DO] Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide 
Guidance? 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1987). 
4See id. 
5See LAFFERTY, LANDE, & KIRKWOOD, IMPACT 
EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
VERTICAL RESTRAINT CASES (1984). The fifo 
teen cases were chosen because they were 
amenable to impact evaluation analysis. See 
id. 
6See FlC's Chief &onomist Resigns: Gramm is 
Likely Candidate for Post, 44 Antitrust & Trade 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 227 (1983). 
7The Herfindahl·Hirschman Index is a 
measure of market concentration. It consists 
of the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of the firms in the relevant market. 
For example, the merger of a firm with 10% 
of a market and one with 5% would yield a 
Herfindahl increase of 100. 
8The preceding analysis assumes that mar· 
ket share is the only important variable in 
their conduct have conformed to a 
higher standard of faithfulness to the 
law? 
As the preceding discussion has 
shown, a systematic evaluation of the an-
titrust legacy of the Reagan administra-
tion is a formidable undertaking. The 
foregoing contains some of the neces-
sary questions. I don't pretend to have 
the answers, and it would be asking too 
much of the authors of the articles to 
follow to require them to fully answer 
them. Each of the authors has, of neces-
sity, only undertaken part of the task of 
filling in the analytical framework I have 
laid out above, yet each will contribute to 
history'S final judgment. 
the decision to challenge a merger. This is, of 
course, incorrect, and I use this assumption 
for simplicity of illustration only. 
9Another complicating factor is that the 
number of large horizontal mergers has 
risen dramatically since 1980. 
!OSee Sims & Lande, DO] Adds Revisionist 
Dollop to '82 Merger Guidelines, Legal Times, 
June 25,1984, at 15, col. 1. 
IlSee id. 
12See id. 
13See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Consider-
ations in Merger Enforcement,"'71 CALIF. L. REv. 
1580 (1983). 
14For alternative approaches that provide 
more business certainty, see id. 
15See Sims & Lande, supra note 10, and the 
sources cited therein. 
IfiSpeech by Jeffrey Zuckerman before the 
District of Columbia Bar Association Anti-
trust Section (Nov. 3, 1986). 
17See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 
3, at 614·15, 637-42. 
18S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
19H.R. 585, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
20See id. at 641. 
21The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 
the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral are reprinted in 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S·4 (Spec. Supp. 
Mar. 12, 1987). 
220f course, if the percentages were re-
versed, per se legality might be appropriate_ 
23There is, perhaps, a sixth overall task of 
the antitrust enforcers. This concerns vari· 
ous internal matters at the antitrust enforce· 
ment agencies. For example, did the admin· 
istration build or dissipate the human 
capital of the agencies? How well did it insti· 
tute and implement affirmative action pro· 
grams? How fairly did it treat employees? 
These goals are, of course, important insofar 
as they affect the output of the agencies. But 
they are also important considered alone. 
24See Fisher & Lande, supra note 13, at 
1587·93. 
25See Henderson, Baldrige Merger Plan Criti· 
cized, Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 1985, at Fl, F8, col. 
6. 
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